On December 9, 2019, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Paris for a Normandy Format summit brokered by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The summit was the first meeting of these four parties in three years, a move that Zelensky heralded as already a step in the right direction.
But many in Ukraine did not seem to agree. In October, Zelensky agreed to the Steinmeier Formula as a way to broker peace in the region; its implementation would require local elections in the non-government controlled territories in the Donbas and possible regional autonomy. While many understand the need for compromise, demonstrations against Ukraine’s capitulation to Russia broke out in Kyiv, and protests in Paris and Kyiv took place right before the meetings. On December 3, three opposition leaders—Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Slava Vakarchuk—signed a joint statement to ask Zelensky not to make concessions in Paris.
The immediate response to the meetings has been a mix of relief and cautious optimism. Those same opposition leaders praised movement toward a prisoner exchange and Ukraine’s control over its eastern borders. Ukraine and Russia agreed to implement the Minsk II ceasefire before the end of the year. And the two presidents have agreed to continue to meet to resolve the conflict.
Below, HURI affiliates present critical commentary on the Normandy Format summit and offer some speculations about where these meetings will lead in the future.
Oxana Shevel: No Capitulation by Zelensky
The December 9 Normandy summit, the first one since October 2016, unfroze the Minsk peace process and raised hopes that a solution to the nearly six-year-old conflict in the Donbas may be within reach. Surveys of Ukrainians show that a vast majority want to see an end to the war in the Donbas and support a negotiated settlement, but they are not ready for peace on any terms. Many of the specific initiatives concerning the peace process – including those within the two Minsk peace agreements from September 2014 and February 2015 – remain unpopular in Ukraine. There is no majority support for holding elections in the uncontrolled territories of the Donbas without Ukraine regaining control of these territories and of its eastern border with Russia, for granting amnesty to members of illegal armed groups fighting on the separatist side, or for granting the local councils of the occupied territories the right to create national police units.
As the Normandy summit approached, some in Ukraine feared that the inexperienced political newcomer, president Volodymyr Zelensky, may compromise too much on the Donbas issue when facing hard-hitting Vladimir Putin. Dire warnings and talk of zrada (Ukrainian for betrayal) filled airwaves in Ukraine ever since the Zelensky team agreed in September to a condition set by Russia for participating in a Normandy summit - the so-called Steinmeier Formula. The formula calls for elections to be held in the separatist-held territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions under Ukrainian legislation and the supervision of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). If the OSCE judges the elections to be free and fair “overall,” then a special self-governing status for these territories will come into force. Whether elections and special status are to take place before or after Ukraine regains control of its Eastern border (some 400km of which it currently does not control) was not specifically addressed in the Steinmeier Formula, and with Russia advocating the former interpretation, just how much Zelensky would compromise in Paris was anyone’s guess.
After the December 9 meeting, the no-to-capitulation camp in Ukraine could breathe a sigh of relief, as Ukraine’s negotiating team held firm on the principle that meaningful free and fair elections are not possible until foreign armed forces leave the region and stay out, which in turn makes Ukraine regaining control of its eastern borders a must before elections can take place. Zelensky also confirmed in Paris that Ukraine remains steadfast in not equating special status with the federalization that Russia has long supported within the framework of the Donbas peace plan. Russia’s federalization notion is rightfully seen in Ukraine as a euphemism for allowing the re-integrated Donbas region to potentially have veto power over the central government’s decisions, including foreign policy alliances.
Russia’s expectations for a more cooperative Zelensky may have been frustrated, and both presidents acknowledged in Paris that they disagree over the sequence of elections and special status vs reinstatement of Ukraine’s control over its state border in the Donbas. The agreements that were reached do not thus constitute a major breakthrough, but if the agreed-upon steps (exchange of all known prisoners, lasting ceasefire, troop pull-out in three additional areas, OSCE monitoring in the conflict area not only during daylight but also at nighttime) are implemented, these would be beneficial for Ukraine.
To keep searching for the overall political solution, the Normandy leaders agreed to meet again in March. Ukraine thus bought itself some time to think through the details of acceptable terms for elections and special status, and to try to find a compromise on the sequencing. So far such a compromise remains out of reach, and Russia is seemingly in a stronger negotiating position, as it presents its position that Ukraine cannot regain control of the border until after elections as stemming from the text of the February 2015 Minsk II agreement. Point nine in the agreement states that Ukraine’s control of its border “has to start on the first day after the local election.” If Ukraine wants to regain border control before the elections, on the logic that a meaningful democratic elections cannot be conducted on a territory where foreign military is present and is free to come and go across the border, Zelensky and his team need backing of western partners within the Normandy four. Ukraine’s interpretation is consistent with the spirit, even if not fully with the letter, of Minsk, and perhaps more importantly with the common-sense understanding of what constitutes a democratic vote. It remains to be seen if the next three months we will see a creative solution to the current deadlock on the issue of borders and elections, or if Zelensky will be forced to go to his “plan B” by admitting that the conflict is unsolvable because the Russian and Ukrainian positions are fundamentally incompatible.
Oxana Shevel is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. She holds a PhD in Government from Harvard University, an M.Phil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge in England, and a BA in English and French from Kyiv State University in Ukraine. Shevel's research and teaching focus on the post-Communist region surrounding Russia, and issues such as nation- and state-building, the politics of citizenship and migration, memory and religious politics, and challenges to democratization in the post-Soviet region. She is the author of Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Postcommunist Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2011), which examines how the politics of national identity and strategies of the UNHCR shape refugee admission policies in the post-Communist region, leading countries to be more or less receptive to refugees. Her research has appeared in a variety of journals, including Comparative Politics, Current History, East European Politics and Societies, Europe-Asia Studies, Geopolitics, Nationality Papers, Post-Soviet Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, and Slavic Review, and in edited volumes.
Volodymyr Dubovyk: Status Quo Intact; No “Red Lines” Crossed
The results of the recent Paris summit within so-called Normandy format is neither success nor a failure. The status quo remains pretty much intact, and the way forward remains rather murky. For Ukraine it did not bring a breakthrough of any sort, nor did it entail any major concessions or zrada (betrayal) of national interests.
Perhaps the expectations were too high, even unrealistic for some. V. Zelensky and his team have contributed to this somewhat as they had promised to strive for peace. He is now learning the hard way what was obvious to many for so long: the keys to conflict resolution are mostly in the hands of the Kremlin. The policies of Kyiv matter, of course, but there is a limit to what V. Zelensky can achieve single-handedly. The space for maneuver remains narrow and pressure from Moscow, Paris, and Berlin, as well as from the opposition at home is palpable.
That Normandy got reactivated after being dormant for three years is probably a good thing. Ukraine needs to explore all avenues. However, it is, like the Minsk Agreements, unequal -- and not in the interest of Ukraine. It all comes down to Minsk, ultimately, which is very unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine struggles with fulfilling its obligations under the Minsk Agreements, in the context of the other side basically ignoring its obligations. The charade about who the other side is goes on, as in real life Ukraine surely deals with ongoing Russia-led aggression, and in Paris the talks were again full of euphemisms about Kyiv’s need for a dialogue with “Donbas”.
The “red lines” for V. Zelensky were not crossed. There wasn’t a single concession on matters of principle. The agreements reached seem tentative. The ceasefire and the prisoner exchange might happen or not. The disagreement about the preferred sequence of events—elections/disarmament/border control—remains a stumbling block. Kyiv seems willing to entertain revision of the Minsk Agreement in that regard, and A. Merkel appeared to support this, but the Kremlin remains adamant about this being a non-starter.
It seems that baby steps have been made toward “freezing” the conflict, with the Donbas becoming another Transnistria. This scenario was always very real. Ukraine tried to avoid this all along but the price is steep - maintaining the status quo costs lives and funds and does not necessarily open a prospect of Donbas reintegration. It is an awful dilemma, as both options here are bad for Ukraine and fine for Putin. There might still be a way forward, a “third path” that would allow the reintegration of the Donbas. But the acceptance of any third path would depend on what (and whose) conditions.
For the process to go ahead would require a lot. Ukraine should stick to the course of looking for peace while not giving up too much in trying to get it. This is a tricky thing to do; it would require looking for a consensus within Ukraine’s political class (or most of it, at least). It is not the time to play the “blame game”; blaming the predecessors, as V. Zelensky did in Paris, should cease once and for all. He is a president with a strong mandate and he should put the elections behind him. Most critics of the president agree that he has done reasonably well in Paris and stood up for Ukraine’s interests. Not going after the opposition in a petty, revengeful way is certainly needed as well.
The support of the West remains instrumental. Paris and Berlin must show that they are still on the side of the victim and not the aggressor (and show a united front, preferably). Despite the assistance now being unblocked and bipartisan support of Ukraine standing firm, the US is, regrettably, pretty much self-absorbed at this decisive hour. This is the most unfortunate fallout of the ongoing scandal where Ukraine unwillingly has appeared in the whirlwind of American domestic politics. The EU has to play its part, specifically by not reversing its sanctions on Russia prematurely, which is to say before Russia dramatically alters its behavior toward Ukraine.
Volodymyr Dubovyk is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and the Director of the Center for International Studies at Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University (Ukraine). He conducted research at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1997, 2006-2007) and the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (2002) and taught at the University of Washington (Seattle) in 2013 and at St. Edwards University/University of Texas (Austin) in 2016-17. He is the co-author of Ukraine and European Security (Macmillan, 1999) and has published numerous articles on US-Ukraine relations, regional and international security, and Ukraine’s foreign policy.
Mariana Budjeryn: More Pressure on Ukraine to End Conflict
As expected, the Normandy format meeting on December 9 did not deliver any new and ground-breaking solutions or grand bargains concerning the resolution of Ukraine’s security predicament. On the one hand, the fact that the presidents of Ukraine and Russia have met and talked, with France and Germany present at the table, is a positive development, as is the agreement to conduct follow-up talks in April. However, the meeting essentially upheld previous Minsk process commitments, including the controversial Steinmeier formula. To the extent that the Steinmeier formula may not be advantageous for Ukraine, reaffirming it at a high-level Normandy format meeting gives it more weight and puts Ukraine further at a disadvantage.
There is an urgency to do something about the Donbas. The European powers, especially France and Germany, who are mediating at the Normandy table, would like for the conflict to be resolved so that Europe can move on and normalize relations with Russia. The easiest way to do this is to put pressure on Ukraine, the weakest party at the Normandy table, and take advantage of President Zelensky’s desire to fulfill his election pledge and end the war in the Donbas. Ukraine, in the current circumstances, however, has little leverage to negotiate a deal that would end the conflict on conditions advantageous for Ukraine and create conditions for a sustainable, just peace in Ukraine’s east.
The Steinmeier formula puts the bulk of heavy lifting on Ukraine’s shoulders: pulling back of the troops, passing new legislation in the Rada on the temporary status of the occupied territories, preparing for local elections in the Donbas which would involve engaging directly with the authorities of the self-declared republics of LNR and DNR. Russia walked away from the Normandy talks with no costly items on their to-do list, nor did it assume responsibility for ensuring that its proxies in the Donbas will pull back their troops or ensuring unrestricted access of the OSCE mission in occupied territories.
Meanwhile, questions important to Ukraine--like the securing of Ukraine’s national border, the issue of internally displaced people from the Donbas, control over information space in the lead up and during the proposed Donbas elections, and the source of funding for reconstructing the Donbas down the road--were left unaddressed. It remains to be seen how much Zelensky will manage to get done before the next meeting in April. If he encounters domestic opposition, which he probably will, the onus will again be on Ukraine to fulfill the obligations it undertook in December.
Mariana Budjeryn is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom. She is currently working on a book on nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mariana previously held fellowships at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University (2018-2019) and International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom (2016-2018). Mariana earned her Ph.D. in Political Science from Central European University in Budapest, Hungary.
Viktoriya Sereda: Finding Acceptable Compromises to Promote Peace
The initial effect of the renewed Normandy Format talks in Paris was rather positive for President Zelensky. First, what he achieved went above what was expected from him and was in line with his electoral promises. Second, contrary to the expectations of political commentators, there were no street protests in Ukraine after the Paris summit. In particular, Zelensky successfully used rhetoric of the “red lines,” which could not be crossed, at the final press conference. This rhetoric helped to legitimize the idea of negotiations with Putin in the Normandy Format. Perhaps the most important of Zelensky’s achievements was a symbolic one. He demonstrated that he was able to revitalize peace talks without losing his credibility.
It is still unclear how the previous Minsk agreement can be implemented, because the Russian side wants to keep control over the part of the Donbas it currently occupies during the envisaged local elections, and this is not acceptable to Kyiv. Each side was flirting with the idea of reformulating the current Minsk formula, although no concrete steps for its realization were proposed. Also, it is alarming that at the final press conference, nobody addressed the issue of deepening economic and ecological crises in the occupied territories of the Donbas, issues which the Ukrainian government will have to deal with in any case.
As recent opinion polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation show, issues that were discussed at the Paris summit might be both divisive and consolidating for Ukrainian society. On the one hand, the question of the reintegration of the Donbas has the highest potential of provoking protests in the country, and the idea of a compromise with Russia is slowly losing support all over the country (except in the Donbas). At the same time, the level of approval for promoting a peace plan is still high (58% of respondents support selective compromises). Despite impressive protest actions on the eve of the talks in Paris, Zelensky still can claim that he fulfils the expectations of his electorate. The main points of agreement that were reached in Paris (on ceasefire, additional zones of disengagement of the front line, and an exchange of prisoners) are those that have popular support in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that those questions do not divide society along regional lines, but rather differentiate an “active minority” (that is, those who do not trust the Russian government and do not believe in a possibility of a fair peace treaty) from the “passive majority” willing to agree with acceptable compromise in order to reach peace in the Donbas.
Viktoriya Sereda is a GIS Research Fellow at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University (2019-2020). Her research focuses on urban sociology, memory studies, nationalism and migration studies. Sereda received her PhD in Sociology at the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 2006, and MSc by Research in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh in 2001. Since 2015 she is an associate professor of sociology at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. In 2017-18 she was a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin (Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin). In 2016-17 worked on the “MAPA: Digital Atlas of Ukraine” project at the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University and developed "History and Identity" and "Language" modules. Recently she co-organized and participated in sociological research projects "Region, nation, and beyond. An Interdisciplinary and transcultural reconceptualization of Ukraine", “Displaced cultural spaces: current Ukrainian refugees” (both based at the University of St.Gallen), and “Present Ukrainian refugees: main reasons, strategies of resettlement, difficulties of adaptation.” She is an author of a number of articles published in Ukrainian, Austrian, German, Hungarian, Polish, Russian Swiss academic journals.